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This study focuses on the formation of in-kind labour income 
in Russia, using 1994 data on individuals, and raises two questi­
ons, firstly about the distributive impact o f social transfers from 
enterprises, and secondly about the effect o f fringe benefits on 
individuals' well being, as captured in self-reported level o f job  
satisfaction. The findings suggest that while social support at the 
work place in the form o f health care remains fairly well equally 
distributed among employees, fringe benefits generally tend to 
be provided to the better-off. Social transfers from firms, along 
with cash wages, are also found to increase jo b  satisfaction signi­
ficantly. Moreover, the estimated levels o f cash-wages necessary 
to compensate for the absence or the dismantling o f enterprise 
benefits, in terms o f employees' welfare, are considerable. In this 
light, the low level o f  jo b  satisfaction observed in the data among 
Russian employees may well be explained by the recent decline in 
both cash-wages and fringe benefits.
*1 am very grateful to John Micklewright for his close supervision. I also wish to 
thank Michel Sollogoub and Vladimir Mikhalev for their helpful comments, Frédéric 























































































































































































Firms traditionally played a major role in the system of social support 
in Russia for both ideological and practical reasons. On the one hand, 
enterprises were by no means considered exclusively as organisations of 
production, but also as comprehensive social policy agencies. On the 
other hand, as firms were allocated a planned wage fund and as wage ra­
tes were defined for each occupation, provision of non-cash wages became 
an important tool used to manipulate relative earnings and to attach wor­
kers to the firm while avoiding the tariff wage system. In-kind transfers 
granted by firms were widespread and in general more extensive than 
is found in OECD countries. Employees commonly received important 
benefits such as housing, kindergartens, medical care, and access to re­
creational centres for adults and children.
The collapse of the Centrally Planned Economy and the introduc­
tion of market-oriented reforms has created new social needs that were 
not covered by Soviet social programs. Inefficiencies in enterprise-based 
social benefits have recently become a matter of concern (Commander k. 
Jackman [10]). Is it frequently argued that traditional social protection 
at the work place is responsible for labour market rigidity and creates 
barriers to enterprise restructuring. Also, firms eager to cut social ex­
penditure might be led to discriminate against high cost workers, such as 
women with young children. No less important is that redundant workers 
would lose access to social support , which would render the closure of in­
efficient firms politically unacceptable. In an attempt to deal with these 
shortfalls, a new system of social insurance was set up in 1991, in which 
the social role of the firm has been redefined. Delivery of social support 
is now shared between four extra-budgetary funds, several ministries and 
the local authorities, as well as the enterprises through legally manda­
ted contributions and voluntarily provided benefits. At the same time, a 
legal framework was introduced to regulate the divestiture of enterprise 
social facilities.
As a consequence of the deep economic crisis, the living standards 



























































































bed that au important source of poverty in Russia is the depressed level 
of labour income (World Bank [45]) - in 1994. real wages still did not 
exceed 40% of their 1991 level - cash payments may not be a sufficient 
measure of the working population's well being and social transfers from 
firms need to be taken into account. In the current context, in which 
firms face harder budget constraints, and as the result of the closure 
or transfer of enterprise social assets, the share of employed individuals 
with access to social services at the work place is likely to have decreased 
significantly. However, the speed at which social services are dismantled 
is expected to vary according to the structure of preferences for diffe­
rent benefits. It appears that housing and pre-school education have 
been strongly affected by divestiture policy. At present, about half the 
housing stock previously controlled by firms has been transferred to mu­
nicipalities (Commander A Schankerman.[ll]). The situation for health 
care and recreational facilities is somewhat different. Empirical evidence 
(Commander A al [12]. Mikhalev [32]) suggests that firms wish to keep 
these services despite the fact that employees are less dependent on en­
terprise medical facilities than they were on housing or kindergartens: 
in 1993. only 6% of all hospitals and 8% of all out-patient clinics were 
owned by enterprises (Mikhalev [32]).
The aim of this paper is to analyse the way enterprise social be­
nefits have been distributed among the working population during the 
transition, and to look at their impact on workers’ well being. It is my 
view that too little attention has been focused on these issues, which 
are important for several reasons. First, looking at the determinants of 
access to enterprise welfare at an advanced point of the transition could 
provide a basis for understanding further developments in the structure 
of compensation between cash wages and different types of benefits in 
Russia. Second, from au equity perspective, the question of how far so­
cial transfers from enterprises reduce income iuequalitit.es rather than 
increase it needs to be addressed. Third, it is striking to see that the 
literature that exists on enterprise benefits in Former Socialist Countries 
hardly touches on the welfare implications of divestiture policies, when 
the extent to which workers are attached to nonpecuniary rewards may 




























































































nefits and shed more light on the significance of these social transfers for 
workers' well-being.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a conceptual 
framework designed to single out the determinants of fringe benefits in 
the Russian context, and to explore the extent to which non-cash wages 
may flatten the distribution of labour income. Section 3 develops a sim­
ple model where fringe benefits, along with cash-wages, are important 
determinants of labour allocation and happiness at work. This model is 
designed to yield information on the separate demand side and supply 
side effects on enterprise benefits. It generates a fringe benefit equa­
tion and a utility function in pecuniary and nonpecuniary wages to be 
estimated in Section o. Section 4 describes the data used for the empi­
rical analysis. Section 5 reviews the methodology adopted to estimate 
the fringe benefit equation and the indirect utility function derived from 
section 3. Section 6 summarises the most important results.
2 Conceptual framework
2.1 The determinants of fringe benefits
This section investigates the extent to which there may be a demand 
and supply for enterprise benefits in Russia during transition. On the 
one hand, it can be argued that the current existence of such benefits is 
mainly a Soviet legacy. Since employees generally prefer cash payments 
while employers are indifferent between the structure of compensation or 
may even favour cash wages, enterprise benefits are not justified by any 
economic rationality. Consequently, the provision of benefits by firms 
will probably cease. Against this, one can argue that workers may be 
willing to receive part of their remuneration package in the form of fringe 
benefits, while employers may wish to provide these benefits voluntarily. 
Thus, the current provision of enterprise benefits may partly reflect the 
distribution of employee and employer preferences, and the transition 






























































































It is a well-established result of the theory of choice that all other things 
being equal, employees prefer cash transfers rather than in-kind benefits 
of equal money value. Cash is the form of payment that gives the reci­
pient the most options in maximising utility while in-kind payments are 
inherently more restrictive and act as a constraint imposed on consumer 
choice.
The restrictive nature of in-kind benefits can however be offset by 
several factors in such a way that they affect employee demand for in- 
kind benefits. A first reason generally put forward as an explanation for 
why employees may wish to receive fringe benefits through in-kind or de­
ferred payment is that they enjoy a tax advantage over current payment1. 
However, the tax advantage in Russia seems to be weak. Marginal rates 
for personal income tax vary from 12% to 60%, but given the depressed 
wage levels and the underreporting of high earnings, personal income tax 
is generally paid at the minimum rate and does not significantly influ­
ence individuals’ preferences for cash versus in-kind transfers. Inflation 
may also affect the demand for fringe benefits since if cash payments are 
not perfectly indexed, the real value of cash compensation depreciates 
compared with the value of benefits in kind. In Russia, indeed, in 1994 
real wages still did not exceed 40% of their 1991 level [36]. Consequently, 
although constraining consumer choice, a form of in-kind payments may 
well be favoured In' individuals as a way to protect their levels of con­
sumption. There are other factors that might cause employees to prefer 
in-kind benefits rather than their equivalent in cash. Several services 
and goods provided by the firm may be inadequately covered by public 
or private markets. If shortages of consumption goods have almost disap­
peared with price liberalisation, there remains a considerable gap in the 
system of social support. In particular, since workers receive in general a 
much higher quality of health care in firm-held polyclinics and hospitals 
than in those held by municipalities, they may be unwilling to give up 
these services for higher cash wages.
'W oodbury (1983) provides evidence of the impact of tax regulation on the struc­





























































































The basic assumption in economic theory stipulates that employers are 
completely indifferent about the structure of total compensation. Firms 
do not care about whether they distribute cash payments or fringe bene­
fits, but are concerned only with the size of the remuneration package. 
In the current context, with the hardening of budget constraints, firms 
may therefore he expected to reduce indifferently labour costs in cash 
and in-kind wages indifferently. But while cash wages may be gradually 
adjusted, cuts in fringe benefits may only be possible if the social as­
sets used to provide these benefits are closed or divested, thus leading 
to the complete interruption of these benefits. Employers may also have 
preferences for cash rather than in-kind payments. The reasons for this 
are threefold. First of all. social benefits are generally awarded to cur­
rent workers regardless of their actual hours of work. This may increase 
absenteeism or attract workers whose motivation is only to ensure conti­
nuing access to enterprise social services while concentrating their effort 
in other jobs. Second, provision of fringe benefits like medical facilities 
could reduce the firm's profitability by attracting workers with health 
problems. Third, since enterprise benefits in the form for instance of 
holiday homes or subsidised goods are of equal value to individuals with 
similar sized families, no matter how much they earn, their value corre­
sponds to a higher percentage of low wage worker compensation. These 
benefits reduce the differentials in compensation between skilled and un­
skilled workers, so that skilled workers could be less likely to work for 
a firm providing benefits. Hence, according to this view, firms have no 
apparent reason to keep their social assets and unless the transfer of so­
cial assets is hindered by the financial capacity of local authorities, or 
unless the benefits provided arise out of collective bargaining2, provision 
of social benefits is likely to be cut.
Alternatively, there may be several reasons why employers have in­
centives to provide fringe benefits rather than cash payments. It could
-Evidence of the impact of trade union on fringe benefits in the US can be found 



























































































be in the interest of the firm to increase the share of fringe benefits in 
the total remuneration package if the reduction in the cost of the wage 
exceeds the expenditures on the fringe itself and the average cost per 
capita of instituting the program if it is not yet installed. Such a situa­
tion cau arise since in-kind wages allow employers to reduce payroll taxes 
or to avoid wage controls when the government tries to regulate wages 
to fight inflation. Currently in Russia there is an excess wage tax'1 and 
enterprises also pay several payroll taxes totalling 33% of the wage bill. 
However, evidence of the positive impact of the tariff wage system on 
fringe benefits has not been found either in Poland (Estrin A; al [17]) or 
in Russia (Commander k. al [12]). At the same time, the share of profits 
used for social purposes is exempt from taxes and several social services 
provided at the work place receive additional external funds1. Other rea­
sons for firms to provide fringe benefits could result from high transaction 
costs for cash payments compared with in-kind wages, currently obser­
ved in the phenomena of wage arrears: cash constraints reduce sharply 
the employer’s ability to distribute cash wages and result in delays or 
non-payment. Similarly, transfers in-kind may be less costly than cash 
for employers in the case of decreasing marginal costs for non-cash wage 
expenditures. Specifically, this can arise if fringe benefits are taken out of 
the firm's production’ , or when fringe benefits are obtained at. discount 
prices.
Apart from cost incentives, social services from the enterprise can 
also be a way to achieve higher productivity, if employees place a high 
value on the benefits provided. It can also be a way to attract a certain 
kind of worker, whereas offering them higher wages might lead to charges 
of discrimination. For instance, employers that wish to hire and retain 345
3The excess wage tax treats average wages in excess of G times the minimum wage 
as profits and subject to the 35% profit tax. However, it should be abolished in 199G.
4As reported by Mikhalev [32], enterprise medical facilities get some funds from 
local health budgets and from regional funds for medical insurance. Similarly, recrea­
tional facilities are subsidised from the Social Insurance Fund and by Trade Unions. 
However, the additional sources of funds are not enough to maintain these facilities 
properly.
5 For instance, a study realised by Brochier and Bonin [5] in a kolkhoze reports that 





























































































a stable work force may wish to provide holiday homes anti recreational 
camps to their workers and their families.
Finally, ethical reasons may also affect employer preferences in fa­
vour of social benefits. There is a long tradition of enterprise paternalism 
in Russia6 7and employers may wish to play an active role in the system 
of social support during the transition'.
2.2 The distributive impact of enterprise benefits
The previous paragraph has discussed the extent to which the continua­
tion of social transfers from firms during the transition period could be 
attributed to the Soviet legacy or whether a form of economic rationality 
could justify these non-wage benefits. The practical question raised now 
relates to equity considerations and leads to two hypotheses concerning 
the effect of enterprise subsidises on the distribution of labour income.
2.2.1 Fringe benefits as an equalising factor on labour income
In-kind transfers from enterprises may be expected to flatten the distri­
bution of labour income for two mainly two reasons. On the one hand, 
if the goal pursued by employers when providing benefits is to support 
the living standards of employees, then access to these benefits would be 
granted regardless of individual productivity. Access to social services
6 It is worth recalling here that enterprise paternalism is not specific to former 
socialist countries. Such behaviour was also observed in large companies in Europe 
in the XIX century, and in Japanese firms.
7Evidence of this phenomenon has been found in several empirical studies. Com­
mander et al [12] report that a large proportion of managers interviewed in a large 
World Bank survey of firms cited social and ethical reasons for continuing the provi­
sion of benefits. In Rein He al [39], 79% of managers reported providing benefits to 
support the living standards of their employees. As also mentioned by De Montlibert 
[14], interviews carried out in Russian enterprises suggest roughly two kinds of mana­
gers. First, there were those concerned with the cost of social provision, who looked 
forward to the externalisation of social activities. They point to Western management 
methods and try to substitute in-kind benefits with cash wages. Very often, these at­
titudes make them unpopular among workers, highlighting preferences for some fringe 
benefits. The other type of managers seem more preoccupied with the stability of the 



























































































may be open to all workers or even targeted on specific groups, accor­
ding to needs, as is the case for allocation of public social support. Access 
would be independent of personal characteristics that typically affect wa­
ges (Human Capital. Signalling theories). The share of social transfers 
in total labour compensation would then have an equalising effect on the 
distribution of earnings.
On the other hand, firms that do not provide benefits may be ob­
liged to distribute higher cash wages, this being the implicit root of the 
compensating wage differential hypothesis. Consequently, low paid em­
ployees could be expected to receive more benefits.
2.2.2 In-kind wages as a source of income inequality
In-kind wages may alternatively tend to increase wage inequalities. First 
of all. given the deep economic crisis prevailing in Russia and the exi­
stence of segmented labour markets, workers may have little opportunity 
to change jobs. In this case, compensating wage mechanisms would not 
occur. There may be a form of economic dualism, and workers from equal 
backgrounds and of equal ability may receive different amounts of both 
money wages and nonmonetary compensation because of their location 
in different firms or economic sectors. Such a phenomenon! is observed in 
Russia, where a few large formerly state-owned firms, in profitable sec­
tors, with considerable market power and easy access to various funds, 
are able to pursue a range of objectives that are not available to other 
firms8. In the former, employees may still access several social benefits 
along with relatively high cash wages, while in the latter, the presence of 
hard budget constraints would constrain the level of wages, both in cash 
and in kind.
There are other reasons why in-kind transfers from enterprises may 
be a source of income inequality. Transparency in the criteria used for 
allocation of fringe benefits at the work place can be questioned. It is 
possible that the size of compensation, both in cash and in kind, depends
8 For instance, evidence from aggregated data (Sotsialnie-ekonomitcheskoe polo- 
jenie Rossi. Goskomstat. Jan-Nov 1994) show that the average social expenditures 
spent on an employee in the gas sector were ten times bigger than the ones received 




























































































ou the* position of the individual in the firm's structure of power. Survey 
evidence [1] supports a form of labour segmentation even within firms and 
tends to indicate that the privatisation program has created a perverse 
governance structure, which only serves to strengthen the position of 
special interest groups in exploiting the firm's assets, including social 
welfare.
3 Modelling the access to enterprise wel­
fare and workers’ well-being
3.1 A model of job selection
This section incorporates fringe benefits in a simple model9 which consi­
ders the problem of choice on the part of workers and firms, facing a given 
wage-benefits ratio, in a scenario in which both employees and employ­
ers vary in their preferences for pecuniary and nonpecuniary rewards. 
Enterprise benefits, together with cash wages, appear to be important 
determinants of job choice, and the matching process described below is 
shown to generate a fringe benefit equation to be estimated in section 5.
3.1.1 Workers’ choice
Consider a worker i whose dilemma is to select a specific job j  among 
.7 jobs that vary with respect to monetary and non-monetary charac­
teristics. In all jobs, the hours of work for each worker are equal and 
prescribed by the employer10. It can safely be assumed that each wor­
ker cares both about monetary and non monetary rewards from a job. 
Nonpecuniary benefits are supposed to be objective and measurable, in 
the sense that everyone would agree on the quantity of benefits a job 
provides, even if individuals differ in their preferences for the bundle 
of wage/non-wage job characteristics. For simplicity, let us assume that
’’ The general approach is developed by Lucas[29].
101 do not consider the decision to supply a given number of hours of work, since 
generally fringe benefits are awarded regardless of the length of work. In addition, it 





























































































those preferences are partially determined by a vector of measured perso­
nal characteristics A, and by other individual specific attributes that are 
not observed a,. One's total compensation, both in cash and in kind, is 
assumed to depend on human capital variables - not everybody is offered 
the same remuneration package for any given job - and on the charac­
teristics of the job actually chosen. The total compensation offered to 
worker i can then be written as where <r,j is the real monthly
cash wage, and Z{j is the money value of a composite good representing 
all the fringe benefits offered. Each worker's utility from a given job j  
is then a function of the wage offered, the value of fringe benefits, and 
the individual preferences represented by both observed and unobserved 
taste related components:
Uij -  U{wij,z ij:A ,.a i) all i . j  (1)
Assuming that individuals t ake pecuniary ami nonpecuniary pay 
between jobs as given, each worker will choose the job that provides him 
with the highest utility. In other words, the worker will weigh up the 
monetary and non monetary characteristics of each job and will compare 
the utilities attainable in these different jobs. This choice problem is 
illustrated graphically in Figure la in the Appendix. Assuming a conti­
nuum of job offers, workers have to choose from a set of jobs bounded 
by a frontier of job offers such as (J J)11. Worker i's utility is maximised 
at the point where the indifference curve is tangential to the offer curve. 
This results in equating the marginal rates of substitution between the 
monthly real wage offered to worker i and the value of fringe benefits 
with the ratio of their shadow prices. These conditions provide a set of 
supply functions for each worker i:
©0 =©((«•;... 4 M~i.... -j.... (2)
where
0'b =  1 if worker / selects job j  
=  0 otherwise
"T h e  offer curve may not look as the one depicted in Figure la, however. It will 
slope downward under the assumption that employers providing higher fringe benefits 




























































































for i =  1 ... .  I  and j  =  \ . . .  J . The decision of worker i to choose job 
j  depends on the level of the real wage and the extent of fringe benefits 
provided in job j  compared with monetary and non monetary benefits 
that could be received in other jobs, and on the way worker i values the 
differential in pay, both in cash and in kind, between jobs. Note that 
the set of job offers J may be small, so that workers may be strongly 
constrained in their choice of the desired wage-benefit ratio.
3.1.2 Enterprise choices
On the other side, the employer in job j  faces a wage/benefit trade-off12 13
and has to decide whether to hire, and which type of worker to hire. For 
simplicity, let us assume that both decisions are simultaneous. To each 
job j  corresponds a global remuneration package per capita in the form of 
fringe benefits : tJ and the monthly wage offer wtJ that depends both on 
the personal characteristics of worker i (Human capital. Signalling theo­
ries) and on the characteristics of job j . Holding other things constant, 
the net profit of firm j  generated by worker i can safely be assumed to be 
a function of the total labour compensation in the form of fringe benefits 
and wage offered to worker type i. Moreover, it may safely be supposed 
that the net profit generated by worker i will vary across jobs, depending 
on other characteristics specific to the job. whether observed Bj or not 
/V 3. Thus:
n,j =  IHu’ij.Zij-.Bj.Sj) all i . j  (3)
The problem of each employer in job j  is then to offer a wage/benefit 
mix that maximises (3), while being potentially acceptable by employees. 
Graphically, in figure lb. the set of acceptable levels of wages and fringe 
benefits are represented by the actual job offers made by all firms (JJ), 
and correspond to an envelope of zero-profit curves for all jobs. Each 
employer has to choose the structure of the remuneration package from 
a set of wages and fringe benefits bounded by a function of feasible job
12This derives from the assumption that to remain competitive, a firm that provides 
large benefits must reduce wages. Similarly, a firm that provides no benefits should 
provide higher cash wages to attract workers.
13Identical workers would generate higher productivity in work where their indivi­




























































































offers. The net profit generated by a worker when in job j  is maximised at 
the point where the isoprofit curve is tangential to the efficiency frontier. 
This condition provides a set of demand functions for each employer in 
job j:
©?; = ©((«'].....«1.... «■])>(-]...... -j...... (4)
where
0f- =  1 if the employer in job j  wishes to hire worker i 
=  0 otherwise
The willingness of the employer in job j  to hire worker i will depend on 
the absolute level of labour compensation both in the form of cash wages 
and fringe benefits, and on the relative level of cash wages he will have 
to pay to i compared with the ones he could have paid to other types of 
workers.
3.1.3 The matching process
The observed relation between enterprise benefits and wages is determi­
ned in such a way that the demand for and supply of different kinds 
of jobs and workers are matched correctly, as depicted in Figure lc. In 
other words, an agreement is reached when the decision of worker i to 
select job j  fits the desire of firm j  to hire worker i:
©0 =  ©o (5)
This condition provides a reduced form for the fringe benefits equation:
Zij — ~ t i^ij• .4,. 13j . o ; ) dll i . j  (G)
The actual fringe benefits received by worker i from job j  depend on 
the real wage received by worker i and on a set of characteristics spe­




























































































3.2 Fringe benefits and happiness at work
Let us consider the intuitive "total" utility function of an individual 1 as 
the one proposed by Clark and Oswald [13]. This utility may be written
as:
C =  V(U,r.Unu.) (7)
where Uw is the instantaneous utility from work and Unw is the utility 
associated with other aspects of the individuals' life. While [  might be 
expected to depend on such factors such as family life, friendships, and 
other variables that are unobserved by economists. U„. reflects the level 
of well-being that a working individual receives from all aspects of his job.
As found in many textbooks in economics, Uu. is generally11 assu­
med to depend on labour income noil-pecuniary characteristics of 
the job performed, including fringe benefits Zjj and other job parameters 
Dj . and on a set of personal characteristics that affect the way workers 
feel towards their job A,. This utility can then be written as:
Uw =  U(wij. : ij .D J;A i). (8)
Further, if job satisfaction at a given moment is a measure of instan­
taneous utility, and assuming that preferences are additively separable, 
we can adopt the following specification for job satisfaction:
L = u]( i r lJ) + »2(c,j) + «3(A,) + u^(Dj) (9)
Estimation of equation (9) will be performed in Section 4 and will 
provide estimates of the impact of pecuniary and nonpecuuiary benefits 
on individual's welfare at a given point in the transition.
"M y  intention is not to test the various models of job satisfaction proposed in 
the literature, nor whether utility from work depends on absolute or relative income. 
The utility function choosen here is conventional in the sens that it depends on the 






























































































The data source for the empirical analysis is drawn from a survey of 2959 
individuals conducted by the Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research 
(VCIOM). Estimation was conducted only on the sub-sample composed 
by the employed individuals, which after cleaning of the data10, reduces 
the sub-sample size to 1256 individuals. It is also worth noting here that 
large scale independent surveys have been permissible in Russia since 
1989. and to my knowledge, the Russian Centre for Public Opinion Re­
search is. with the National Statistical Agency (Goskomstat), the only 
organisation that provides representative samples of the Russian popu­
lation. The survey was undertaken in September 1994. three years after 
price liberalisation, and when the process of market oriented reforms such 
as the privatisation program had been further advanced.
The survey has the advantage that it contains the information re­
quired to estimate equations (6) and (7). The data provide observations 
on earnings in August 1994 (monthly wage in main job net. of tax. family 
income), social benefits received from the work place in the 6 months pre­
ceding the survey (access to social facilities, subsidised goods and other 
social transfers in kind), individual socio-economic characteristics (age, 
gender, education, occupation) and job characteristics (sector, firms' ow­
nership and size). Other information includes the reported subjective 
level of job satisfaction as appraised on a scale from 1 to 4. wage arrears, 
employment expectations, the prevailing atmosphere within the firm, la­
bour hoarding and geographical location.
The survey is intended to be representative of the whole Russian 
adult population, aged 16 and above, urban and rural, and covers the 
entire Russian Federation stratified into 15 regions. The questionnaire
loThe sub sample size was reduced by the necessity of discarding individuals for 
which some observations were missing. Given that non-response rates were higher 





























































































was filled out through personal interviews, and representativeness of the 
respondents is compared in Table 1 with characteristics of total Russian 
population as recorded in the Russian Census of 1989. The sample ex­
hibits a good fit for age and urban/rural division, though women are 
slightly over-represented.



































Note: 1 Whole sample size. Confidence interval at the 95% level for
the sample proportions are reported in brackets. 2As reported in Boeva. 1993.
The survey does have some disadvantages, however. Table 2 shows 
that compared with aggregate data, the sub-sample of employed indi­
viduals seems to overstate the size of some sectors like trade, services, 
health and education. Since the extent of enterprise benefits in these sec­
tors was smaller in the Soviet period, estimates of the proportion of the 
working population receiving social services from the enterprise is likely 
to be understated. Moreover, although the sample contains interesting 
information concerning the contribution of enterprises on individuals’ 
welfare, it could have been more comprehensive . Important observa­




























































































a relatively small sample size when the number of individuals receiving 
enterprise benefits is disaggregated into sub-samples.
Table 2: Working population by branch of employment in 1994















Source: Centre for Economic Analysis for aggregated data. 
VCIOM sub-sample of 1256 employed individuals for sample data.
4.2 Fringe benefits and wage data
Table 3 summarises the sample's data on non-wage benefits received by 
the employees in the 6 months preceeding the survey. The figures reveal 
that at the end of 1994. 9.2% of all surveyed employees were receiving me­
dical services from their firm; 6.6%. access to recreation centres for adult 
and children; 5.1%, education and training; and 2.8%. housing. Other 
fringe benefits received from the work place were cheap meals, 9.2%,; 
provision of subsidised food and other goods. 9.2%; and other welfare 
transfers in-kind, such as funeral expenses, cheap credit, or transpor­
tation subsidies, 12.6%. The number of benefits received given in the 
bottom of the table provides an idea, although imperfect, of the extent 
of social benefits received. It shows in particular that 37%, of the wor­
king population was covered by one or more enterprise benefits, though 
a small fraction of them was receiving two or more benefits. The qua­
lity of the data on nonpecuniary benefits raises some problems, however. 
Reported access to enterprise benefits, though not evaluated in money 
terms, may be misleading. Employees, for instance, may not be aware of 
the extent to which several goods or services are actually subsidised by 




























































































Table 3: Enterprise support received by the employees
Number of Share of surveyed
surveyed individuals employed individuals
Type of social benefits re­
ceived from the firm:
housing 35 2.S
medical care 115 9.2
recreation centres for 83 C.6
adults and children
free or subsidised 88 7
meals
subsidised food and 115 9.2
other goods
education and G4 5.1
training
Other welfare trans- 158 12.G
fers in-kind





3 and more 4G 3.7
Source: September 94 VCIOM survey on 1256 employed individuals.
Table 4 displays summary statistics on the extent of fringe benefits 
by industry. The sample data suggests relatively large sectoral dispari­
ties in the average number of benefits received and. to some extent, fits 
well with aggregated data on average enterprise social expenditures per 
capita. For example, the data show that both the mean benefits and the 
average social expenditures per employee were markedly higher in the 
banking sector - an extremely rapidly expanding area of new enterprises 
- than elsewhere. However, in agriculture, while the number of benefits 
received were on average in the upper tail of the distribution, the ave­
rage social expenditures were extremely low. This shows the difficulties of 
estimating the social wage enjoyed by individuals. On the one hand, the 
number of benefits received provide an imperfect measure of the size of 
fringe benefits because for example, three benefits can have a lower value 
(objective or subjective) than one benefit. On the other hand, looking 
at enterprise social expenditures tells us little about the real distribution 
of benefits across employees, since they may be unequally distributed 
even within firms. Moreover, accurately measuring social expenditures is 




























































































in kind, suck as food and goods, may appear as production costs for the 
firms which produce them.
Table 4: Enterprise social benefits by industries






















Note: aggregated data are given in Sotsialnie-ekonomitckoe polojenic Rossii. 
Goskomstat. and relate to October 1994• The social expenditures 
are in thousand of roubles.
The distribution of the different social services received from the 
firm across wage quartiles is given in Table 5. Important dispersions are 
observed, especially for paid recreation centres, cheap meals, and educa­
tion programs, for which access is concentrated in the top two quartiles. 
In particular, access to cheap meals embraced more than 35% of the 25% 
richest individuals and less than 19% of the 25% poorest. Alternatively, 
enterprise housing accommodation peaked in the bottom of the wage 
distribution. However, as for reported enterprise benefits, and given the 
problem of wage arrears, the monthly wages collected in the survey may 
be subject to measurement errors. Reported monthly wages may be over­
stated if respondents appraised the wage they should have earned instead 
of their actual wage16.
16This was obvious for example in a few observations, where individuals reported 
a positive monthly wage while at the same time answering that their last monthly 




























































































Table 5: Distribution of benefits by wage quartile















Housing 31.4 20 25.0 23 100
Medical care 20.9 22.0 27.S 2S.7 100
Recreation centres for 
adults and children
10.8 14.5 32.5 42.2 100
Free or subsidised meals 18.2 13.0 32.9 35.3 100
Subsidised food and 
other goods
21.7 20.1 IS.3 33.9 100
Education and training 15.0 12.5 37.5 34.4 100
Other welfare transfers 
in-kind
20.3 24 22.1 33.0 100
Note: the values for wage quartile are m thousands of Rubles
To place access to enterprise benefits in a dynamic context, Table 
5 reports the share of surveyed employed individuals receiving these be­
nefits in September 1994. compared with data from a similar VCIOM 
survey on a different sample for August 1993. The data show that the 
share of surveyed individuals reporting access to enterprise housing and 
medical care dropped significantly, by 18 and 22 percent respectively1'. 
This could result from the divestiture of enterprise housing and medical 
facilities. However, as reported in the same table, the sharp decline in 
reported access to housing and health care is striking since it is not obser­
ved in the large World Bank enterprise survey. In fact, according to these 
data, the share of enterprises providing new housing and medical services 
remained stable, and even increased for food and consumer goods* 18. Part 
of the story could be that individuals tend to underreport the benefits 
received from the work place, presumably because they may not be aware 
of the extent to which the benefits provided are subsidised by the firm or 
charged at full cost. Alternatively, firms may overstate the provision of 
fringe benefits when reporting social assets which may in fact have been 
abandoned or available only to specific workers. Moreover, the World 
bank survey was restricted to industrial firms and small firms, in which 
employees are likely to receive less benefits, were underrepresented.
11 On the basis of confidence intervals at the 95% level for the sample proportion.

































































































August 93 September 94 Pre-reform (91) Mid-94
Housing 21 2.S 59 55
Medical care 31 9.2 71 70
Recreation centres for 
adults and children
- 6.6 57 45
Free or subsidised meals 9 7 S3 7S
Subsidised food and other 
goods
13 9.2 52 60
Education and training 4 5.1 - -
Other welfare transfers in- 
kind
12 12.6 ” “
Note: Enterprise evidence was collected from a World Bank survey on 439 
industrial firms and results are reported in Commander et al [12j.
4.3 The self-reported level of job satisfaction
Assessing the impact of social benefits on workers' well-being is made 
possible with the VCIOM data, where employees were asked to appraise 
on a scale of 1 to 4 the extent to which they were satisfied with their job 
in their day to day life. Thus, the questionnaire provides self-reported le­
vels of satisfaction from work which are considered as proxy utility data. 
However, the data are hardly a perfect representation of the real level of 
workers' well-being. They are measured on an ordinal scale and may be 
subject to large measurement error.
Table 7 shows that of the total replies. 47.8% answered that they 
were very dissatisfied: 40.1%, fairly dissatisfied; 8.9%, fairly satisfied; and 
3.2%i, very satisfied. These figures contrast sharply with standard results 
from Western counti'ies where a large majority of workers report a high 
level of job satisfaction19. This is not surprising given the large fall in real 
wages and in access to social services at the work place observed in Russia 
since the beginning of the transition. Also, the self-reported level of job 
"disatisfaction" may reflect a deep disequilibrium in the Russian labour 
market, where disatisfied workers are generally unable to find another 
job that fits their own preferences more closely.
19 For instance, in the Canadian data analysed by Levy-Garboua and Montmar- 
quette [28], more than 90% of surveyed employed individuals were rather or fully 





























































































Table 7: Self-reported level of job satisfaction
Number of 
surveyed individuals
Share of surveyed 
employed individuals
Subjective level o f job
satisfaction:
very dissatisfied C01 47.8
fairly dissatisfied 503 40.1
fairly satisfied 112 8.9
very satisfied 40 3.2
Source: September 94 VCIOM survey on 1256 employed individuals.
The other characteristics of the sample's data used or proven to 
he significant in the econometric analysis are summarised in Table 8. 
As well as mean values, the table provides a detailed description of the 




























































































Table 8: Description of the variables used in estimation
V a r i a b l e s D e s c r i p t i o n M e q n
I n c o m e  v a r i a b l e s :
M o n t h l y  w a g e M o n t h l y  w a g e  in  t h o u s a n d s  r o u b l e s  at t h e  m a in  j o b  a f t e r  
t a x  ( e x c l u d i n g  p e n s i o n s ,  b o n u s e s ,  w e l f a r e  p a y m e n t s )
W a g e  s q u a r e M o n t h l y  w a g e  s q u a r e 8 3 3 8 6
O t h e r  i n c o m e T o t a l  m o n t h l y  h o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e  m i n u s  w a g e s  f r o m  m a in  
a n d  s e c o n d  j o b  o f  r e s p o n d e n t
2 2 1
W a g e  a r r e a r s =  1 i f  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  d i d  n o t  r e c e i v e d  h i s / h e r  w a g e  f r o m  
t h e  m a in  j o b  f u l l y  o r  c o m p l e t e l y
0  51
P e r s o n a l
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :
A g e T h e  a g e  in  y e a r s  o f  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t 3 9 .2
N u m b e r  o f  a d u l t s T h e  n u m b e r  o f  a d u l t  a g e  16 a n d  a b o v e  l i v i n g  in  t h e  
h o u s e h o l d
2 .5 1
N u m b e r  o f  c h i l d r e n T h e  n u m b e r  o f  c h i l d r e n  a g e  15  o r  le s s  l i v i n g  in  t h e  
h o u s e h o ld
0 .8 5
W o m e n =  1 i f  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  is  a  f e m a le  e m p l o y e e 0 .5 9
M a r r ie d =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  is  m a r r i e d  o r  c o - h a b i t a t i n g 0 .6 3
D i v o r c e d =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  is  d i v o r c e d  o r  w i d o w e d 0 .1 8
S in g l e =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  is  s i n g le 0 .1 9
S la v ic =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  is  e t h n i c  R u s s ia n .  I ’ k r a i n ie n .  o r  
B i e lo r u s s i a n
0 .8 9
P r i m a r y  e d u c a t i o n =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  h a s  a  p r i m a r y  e d u c a t i o n 0 .0 1
S e c o n d a r y  e d u c a t i o n =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  h a s  a  s e c o n d a r y  e d u c a t i o n 0 .1 8
T e c h n i c a l  e d u c a t i o n =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  h a s  a  t e c h n i c a l  e d u c a t i o n o n
H ig h  t e c h n i c a l  
e d u c a t i o n
=  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  h a s  a  h i g h  t e c h n i c a l  e d u c a t i o n 0 .3 1
G r a d u a t e =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  h a s  a  g r a d u a t e  e d u c a t i o n 0 .3 6
O c c u p a t i o n :
M a n a g e r s =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  is  a  t o p  o r  m i d d l e  m a n a g e r 0 .1 2
T e c h n i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n a l s =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  a s  a  t e c h n i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n a l  w o r k e r 0 .1 1
N o n - t e c h n i c a l =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  a s  a n o n - t e c h n i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n a l 0 .1 3
p r o f e s s io n a ls w o r k e r
T e c h n i c a l  o f f i c e - w o r k e r =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  a s  a t e c h n i c a l  o f f i c e - w o r k e r o n
N o n - t e c h n i c a l  o f f i c e =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  a s  a n o n - t e c h n i c a l  o f f i c e  w o r k e r 0 .0 9
w o r k e r
S k i l l e d  w o r k e r s =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  a s  a  s k i l l e d  w o r k e r  w o r k e r 0 .3 3
U n s k i l l e d  w o r k e r s =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  a s  a n  u n s k i l l e d  w o r k e r 0 .0 8
E n t e r p r i s e
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :
S m a l l  f i r m =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  is  e m p l o y e d  in  a f i r m  w i t h  le s s  t h a n  20  
e m p l o y e e s
0 .2 0
M e d i u m  f ir m =: 1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  is  e m p l o y e d  in  a f i r m  w i t h  2 1 - 5 0 0  
e m p l o y e e s
0 .5 2
L a r g e  f i r m =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  is  e m p l o y e d  in  a f i r m  w i t h  m o r e  t h a n  5 0 0  
e m p l o y e e s
0 .2 8
S t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  in  a  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  o r  o r g a n i s a t i o n 0 .5 5
L e a s e /J o i n t  s t o c k  s t a t e =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  in  a s t a t e  le a s e  o r  s t a t e  j o i n t  s t o c k 0 .2 3
e n t e r p r i s e e n t e r p r i s e
C o l l e c t i v e  fa r m =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  in  a  c o l l e c t i v e  fa r m 0 .0 3
P r i v a t i s e d  e n t e r p r i s e : =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  in  a n o n - s t a t e  j o i n t  s t o c k  c o m p a n y  
o r  in  a  w o r k e r  c o n t r o l l e d  f i r m
0 .0 7
F ir m  s o l d  t o =  1 i f  p a r t  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y  b e l o n g s  t o  w o r k e r s ,  w i t h  o r 0 .0 1
w o r k e r s w i t h o u t  t h e  r ig h t  t o  v o t e
N o n - s t a t e  j o i n t =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  in  a n o n - s t a t e  j o i n t  s t o c k  e n t e r p r i s e 0 .0 5
s t o c k  c o m p a n y  
N e w  p r iv a t e  f i r m =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  in  a  n e w  p r iv a t e  e n t e r p r i s e ,  i n c l u ­






























































































V a r i a b l e s D e s c r i p t i o n M e a n
I n d u s t r i e s :
I n d u s t r y =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  in  in d u s t r y ,  t r a n s p o r t . 0 .4 3
c o n s t r u c t i o n
A g r i c u l t u r e =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  in  a g r i c u l t u r e 0 .1 2
T r a d e / S e r v i c e s =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  in  t r a d e ,  s e r v i c e s ,  f o o d  d i s t r i b u t i o n 0 .1 6
H e a l t h / E d u c a t i o n =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  in  h e a l t h ,  e d u c a t i o n ,  c u l t u r e 0 .2 6
B a n  k i n g / i n s u  r a n e e =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  in  b a n k i n g ,  in s u r a n c e ,  g o v e r n m e n t  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
0 .0 3
O t h e r  j o b  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :
L a b o u r  h o a r d i n g =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  h a s  e x p e r i e n c e d  a  p e r i o d  o f  u n p a i d  le a v e  
b e c a u s e  o f  a n  a b s e n c e  o f  w o r k  in  t h e  f i r m
1 0 .1 7 0
C o n f l i c t s  w it h =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  a n s w e r e d  t h a t  c o n f l i c t s  b e t w e e n  e m p l o y - 0 .0 5 8
e m p l o y e r s e e s  a n d  e m p l o y e r s  a r i s e d  v e r y  o f t e n  in  t h e  a t  h i s / h e r  w o r k  
p l a c e  la s t  m o n t h s
C o n f l i c t s  a m o n g =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  a n s w e r e d  t h a t  c o n f l i c t s  a m o n g  e m p l o y e e s 0 .0 2 7
e m p l o y e e s a r is e d  v e r y  o f t e n  a t h i s / h e r  w o r k  p l a c e  in  t h e  la s t  m o n t h s
J o b  o p p o r t  u n i t ie s =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  a n s w e r e d  h e / s h e  w a s  l i k e l y  t o  f i n d  a n  
o t h e r  j o b  in  t h e  s a m e  s p e c i a l i t y  in  c a s e  h e / s h e  w o u l d  l o o s e  
t h e  j o b
0 .5 2
L m e m p lo y m e n t
e x p e c t a t i o n
=  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  e x p e c t  t o  l o o s e  h i s  j o b  s o o n 0 .4 0
E m p l o y e e  p o w e r =  1 i f  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t  w o r k s  in  a  f i r m  w h e r e  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  
p o w e r  b e l o n g s  t o  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  o f  w o r k e r s
0 .0 5 8
G e o g r a p h i c a l  
v a r i a b l e s :  
R u r a l  r e s id e n t =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  r e s id e s  in  a  r u r a l  a r e a s  ( j 5 0 0 0  
i n h a b i t a n t s )
0 .2 6
I 'r b a n  r e s id e n t : =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  r e s id e s  in  a  u r b a n  a r e a s 0 .6 4
B i g  c i t y =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  r e s id e s  in  a  b i g  c i t y  (^ ,2 0 0 .0 0 0  
i n h a b i t a n t s )
0 .2 8
S m a l l  c i t y =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  r e s id e s  in  a  s m a l l  c i t y  ( 5 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 .0 0 0 ) 0 .3 6
C a p i t a l  r e s id e n t =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  r e s id e s  in  M o s c o w  o r  S t - P e t e r s b u r g 0 .1 0
N o r t h =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  l iv e s  in  t h is  r e g i o n 0 .3 5
S o u t h =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  l iv e s  in  t h is  r e g i o n 0 .2 2
L I r a l /P r e - U r a l =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  l iv e s  in  t h is  r e g i o n 0 .2 0
S i b i r i a /F a r e a s t =  1 i f  r e s p o n d e n t  l iv e s  in  t h is  r e g i o n 0 .2 3
5 Econometric issues
This section presents the methodology adopted to estimate the reduced 
form outcome of the fringe benefit setting process (equation (6)) as well 
as the utility function generated by pecuniary and lionpecuniary benefits 
received from the work place (equation (8)) and introduced in Section 
3. Estimation of equation (6) will single out the factors that actually 
determine access to fringe benefits and will allow us to quantify the ef­
fects of such variables on access to enterprise welfare. In turn, estimation 
of equation (8) will identify and measure the impact of wage and non- 
pecuniary rewards on employees' well being at a given moment in the 
transition, while providing a basis for understanding and predicting wor­




























































































5.1 Estimating the access to enterprise benefits
Let blj be the latent unobserved variable corresponding to the value of 
a given benefit k received by worker i. The model is built around the 
following latent regression:
b’ki =  3X k. +  c ,  (10)
for k — 1 . . . . ,  7, i — 1 , . . . .  1256. where 3 X  is known as the index func­
tion. A* being the set of explanatory variables including characteristics 
specific to the individual and the job performed. 3 the set of parameters, 
and e an error term with E(e) =  0 and 1 'ar(e) =  a2. In the data. is 
not observed, but we observe the binary variable bki as follows:
bki =  1 if K i>  0
bki -  0 if b*ki =  0
That is, we observe whether respondent i received benefit k (bki — 1) or 
not (6i., =  0). Then.
Pr(6* =  l) =  Pr(6I>0)
=  Pr(e* > - X 3 )
=  F(X/3)
where F(.) is a symmetric cumulative distribution function, with F (—oc) — 
0 and F (+ oc) =  1. What we need is a suitable functional form for F. 
For convenience, e is assumed to follow a logistic distribution and this 
refers to a logit model, though assuming the normal distribution seems 
to make little difference [22]. Hence, we get
Pr(6* =  l) =  M X  3)
exp A' 3 
1 +  exp X  3
(ID
( 1 2 )
where A is the cumulative logistic distribution. Estimates of the marginal 
impact of X  on b is then derived from this distribution and we have:
0Pr(6t =  l) 
dX m
=  MX3) ( 1  -  M X 3 ) ) 3 m (13)
Potential problems with this model are threefold. Firstly, almost 




























































































significantly associated with access to other social services20. With the 
exception of access to enterprise housing accommodation, which was not 
significantly correlated with the provision of any other benefits, more 
than 50'/c of employees receiving a benefit were also receiving one or two 
other benefits. Consequently the coefficients obtained when running the 
different logit equations independently may not be fully efficient, alt­
hough they remain consistent21. Secondly, as the share of individuals 
provided with benefits in the sample is small, estimates of access to only 
one type of benefit give quite large standard errors. Thirdly, the distribu­
tion of enterprise benefits observed in the data is presumably the outcome 
of a matching process. Consequently, it can be difficult to discern the 
extent to which disparities found in the distribution of fringe benefits are 
a-priori a consequence of demand or supply side forces.
The choice of the variable included in the vector A' will follow the 
earlier discussion on the determinants of fringe benefits. The variables 
included in the regression that may affect the demand for benefits are as 
follows:
• Family size, both through the number of adults age 16 and above 
and through the number of dependent children age 15 or less. These 
variables could affect positively workers' preferences for social services at 
the work place when access to benefits is extended to the whole family;
• Age and Gender, since older workers and women are more likely to 
favour fringe benefits, especially when the social services provided cover 
insurable risks, such as disease:
• Other income, other than wages (from first or second job) of the 
respondent. Richer individuals may favour nonpecuniary benefits as a 
way to avoid taxes:
• Education, since generally benefits are provided regardless of the 
level of education. This reduces the differentials in total compensation 
between educated and less educated workers and may make more educa­
ted workers less willing to work for a firm providing benefits.
Other variables that control for supply side effects are:
20Independence tests were performed between each benefit on the basis of the \2 
statistic.
21 Logit estimates for the access to each sample benefits run separately do not use 




























































































• Wage, a negative coefficient being expected if the compensating 
hypothesis is correct, while a positive coefficient would be evidence for a 
form of economic dualism.
• Professional status, both because of the possible returns to specific 
occupation in the form of benefits and because access to various fringe 
benefits may well depend on the position of the individual in the firm 
structure of power;
• Governance structure of the firm the employees were working 
for, which could capture both the extent of employee bargaining power 
and possible access to state subsidises. These may affect the size of 
compensation positively, and in particular the extent of fringe benefits if 
this is the preferred form of remuneration;
• Industries, to control for possible substitution effects between 
firms’ production and wages, and because of the possible concentration 
of profitable activity in some sectors;
• Size of establishment: entered to control for various differences, 
including the extent of the internal labour market and the possibility of 
spreading the costs of fixed social expenditures and of obtaining discount 
prices for benefits;
• Wage arrears - a dummy variable for whether employees received 
their wage completely or on time, since liquidity problems could induce 
employers to substitute cash by in-kind payments. However, this variable 
may also proxy the financial health of the firm and hence be negatively 
associated with social rewards.
Finally, several variables may affect both demand and supply:
• Age, Gender, and Family size, since on the one hand, employers 
that provide social benefits may wish to target support on specific groups 
according to their needs, thus using social criteria for allocating benefits. 
On the other hand, if these social services are not voluntarily provided, 
but result from collective bargaining and/or from the Soviet legacy, the 
firm may wish to cut back on labour costs by discriminating against 
workers that can be identified as having a higher probability of using 
these services;
• Regions and Urban/Rural locations, to control for various diffe­
rences. such as the rapid process of decentralisation in Russia that may 
affect differently the attitude of local authorities towards the divesti­




























































































rural areas, and the more rapid development of markets in Moscow and 
St-Petersburg. which could influence both employee and employer prefe­
rences for retaining large social benefits at the work place.
5.2 Estimating the reported level of job satisfaction
Let individual i's utility from working in job j  (equation (8 )) be given 
by the additively separable indirect utility function:
Uij =  alb, +  / ? £  hi +  7 Zi +  SDj +  e, (14)
t-=i
where II" is the observed monthly wage, b^s are (0 .1 ) dummies equal 
to one if the benefit k is received. Z, and Dj are respectively a set of 
individual and job specific parameters expected to affect job satisfaction 
(to be made precise later), and e is an error term with E(e) =  0 and 
Var(e) =  a2. An immediate problem that arises in estimating (13) is 
the fact that the real level of satisfaction U, enjoyed by worker i from 
his job j  is not observed. What we do observe is the reported level of 
satisfaction with the job S,. as appraised by the individuals on a scale 
of 1 to 4. However, the self-reported level of job satisfaction may be 
thought of as a proxy for the underlying utility from work (8 ). Since this 
variable is of count form and of an ordinal nature, it seems reasonably 
appropriate [7] to estimate equation (12). using an ordered logit model. 
In such a model, the observed ordinal satisfaction 5, is related to 7", by 
a set of cut-off points such that:
=  1 if Co < l ’i < C1
— 2 if Cl < L'i < c2
=  3 if c 2 £  t i < C3
=  4 if C;j < L'i < C4
where c, are to be estimated with 3. By assumption, Co is taken as 
—oc and cq is taken as +oc. This model implies that the probability of 
observing 5, =  j .  j  — 1 , . . . .4 .  is estimated as a linear function of the 
independent variables and the set of thresholds:






























































































= A( Cj -  aH-, - 0 Y .  bki - ~ Z ' -  Ò D J )
*=i
-Mcj- i  -  aWi -  0 Ì2 h, -  ' Z ,  -  ÒDj)
t=i
where A is the logistic cumulative distribution and where the four ca­
tegories for the dependent variable are from the highest to the lowest 
level of satisfaction: “very satisfied", “fairly satisfied", "fairly dissatisfie- 
d“ . “very dissatisfied"-!-. In particular, the marginal impact of changes 
in the regressors on the probability that an individual is fairly or very 
satisfied is:
c>Pr(S, =  3 U 5, =  4) 
dX m
=  A(flA" -  c2) -  [1 -  A(«A" -  C,)]0m (IT)
where X  € ( 11'. b^.Z.D).
Along with cash-wages and fringe benefits received at the work 
place, utility from working is likely to depend on personal-specific and 
job-specific characteristics. This justifies the inclusion in the regression 
of a number of individual and job controls. The first set of variables ente­
red in the regression through Z  were education, which raises aspiration, 
occupation, age. race, gender, and location. The second set of individual 
controls considered the role of household structure and includes variables 
indicating marriage, the number of young children and adults in the hou­
sehold. and the financial necessity of working, measured through other 
labour income and constructed as the difference between total household 
income and the respondent's labour income from his main job. On the job 
side, dummies for the type of industry, wage arrears, labour hoarding, the 
frequency of conflicts between the collective of workers and the employ­
ers or among workers, the firm's size and its type of ownership (private, 
state, quasi-state), and whether the firm is effectively controlled by the 
collective of workers were used as controls for working conditions. Lastly, 
job security and the potential role of local labour market conditions in 
influencing quits were also taken into account, the expected impact here 
being that job satisfaction increases when the expectation of being laid 




























































































6 Results of estimation
6.1 The determinants of access to enterprise welfare
Table 9 displays the logit estimated coefficients of equation (12) with 
their t-statistics in parentheses beneath. Six different equations were per­
formed for each sample benefit and the values of the pseudo R-squared 
and the percentage of correctly predicted values show that not all the 
specifications are comparable in terms of goodness of fit: access to hou­
sing. recreation centres, subsidised goods and cheap meals are better 
explained than access to medical facilities, other welfare transfers, or 
training/education schemes. The variables shown to be significant in ex­
plaining the reduced form outcome for the fringe benefit equations are 
as follows: monthly wage in first job and its square, wage arrears (a 
dummy equal to one if respondent's wage was not paid completely or on 
time), age. the number of adults and children in the household, educa­
tion (5 categories), and occupation (o groups). As well as control for 
individual characteristics, firm specific effects were captured through the 
inclusion of the size of establishment (3 categories) and the governance 
structure (5 groups). Additional explanatory variables control for secto­
ral disparities (5 groups), the type of settlement (rural, urban. Moscow 
- St-Petersburg). and regional effects (gathered in 4 macro-regions).
To aid the interpretation of the logit outcomes, the changes in the 
predicted probabilities for dummies were computed at average values 
of all the other explanatory variables. The models were also used to 
generate wage elasticity estimates at the average values of wage for the 
whole sample and for two sub-samples corresponding to the subset of 
individuals lying in the first and the fourth wage quartile respectively. 
Table 9 presents these elasticities and the most interesting results are 
discussed below.
6.1.1 T he im pact o f  personal characteristics
The individual's age is negatively associated with access to housing, sub­
sidised goods, and education/training schemes. The results for housing 
and training are as expected, while a positive coefficient could have been 




























































































expected rate of job tenure among older workers. Access to medical fa­
cilities and health care, in turn, were not related to age, while provision 
of such benefits might have attracted older workers. Provision of cheap 
meals and other welfare transfers were also equally distributed among 
different age groups of workers. Similarly, the fear that female employ­
ees may have been discriminated against, especially given their higher 
probability to use medical services, seems unfounded. More generally, 
contrary to cash wages22, the data exhibits no significant differences in 
the distribution of employee benefits among women and men.
The number of adults and young children in the household was 
expected to play a significant role in access to social benefits, because, 
as discussed earlier, they may affect both employee and employer prefe­
rences. This prediction is correct with respect to access to cheap meals 
and housing. The size of household (adults and children age 15 or less) 
increased significantly the probability of receiving cheap meals, high­
lighting a form of social criteria in allocation of cheap meals as well as 
the fact that the whole family seems to have access to this benefit at the 
work place. Provision of housing is in turn negatively associated with the 
number of adults (young households receiving housing accommodation 
are less likely to share a flat with their parents) and positively affected 
by the number of children age 15 or less. It is worth recalling here that 
divestiture of enterprise housing was further advanced in 1994, the vast 
bulk of housing having been privatised or transferred to municipalities. 
Hence, the positive impact of the number of children on housing may in­
dicate that the very small fraction of the population that continue to be 
housed by their enterprise may be actually a very specific and targeted 
group.
The effect of dummies controlling for education is examined relative 
to secondary education and shows that there are no returns to schooling 
in fringe benefits. For other welfare transfers in-kind, having a higher 
education even decreases the predicted probability of access by nearly 
2%. This confirms the presumption that fringe benefits, contrary to 
money rewards, are provided regardless of the level of education, thus 
reducing the differentials in labour compensation between educated and 
less-educated workers.
22 Newell and Reilly [34] found that on average in 1992 men in Russia earned 46% 




























































































6.1.2 Effects o f  wage and wage arrears
Controlling for other factors correlated with wages which could also affect 
access to enterprise welfare, recreation centres, cheap meals, subsidised 
goods and other welfare transfers were all concave in wage with similar 
estimates for the recreation and the meals equation. The inclusion of the 
quadratic term was accepted at less than the blA level in all equations. 
Provision of these benefits are estimated to peak at values above the 
fourth wage quartile: 960 thousand roubles for recreation centres. 1033 
for meals. 703 for subsidised goods, and 594 for other welfare transfers 
in-kind. This finding could help to explain the considerable dispersion in 
access to benefits observed by wage quartile in Table 5. It seems that up 
to a certain extent, only employees in well paid firms continue to have ac­
cess to fringe benefits. In turn, the negative coefficient on wage squared 
may support the compensating wage hypothesis, but only in the upper 
tail of the wage distribution and for a small fraction of the sample popu­
lation. presumably in new private and informal sectors. Social coverage 
from enterprises seems to act therefore much more as a factor in widening 
differences in the distribution of income than in narrowing them. The 
wage elasticities and the wage effects on the predicted probabilities are 
reported in Table 9. The estimates for the elasticities indicate that at 
the average value of wage and all the other variables, a one point increase 
in wage leads to an estimated 0.42 to 0.66 increase in the probabilities 
of access to recreation centres, cheap meals, subsidised goods, and other 
welfare transfers in-kind. Moreover, holding other variables constant, an 
increase in wage from the first quartile to the third quartile increases the 
predicted probabilities for these benefits by 1(A to b%.
Two important benefits, however, like housing and medical facili­
ties. were not at all related to wage. The insignificance for housing may 
be a result of the small number of observations. The finding for medical 
facilities is more interesting, especially when compared to the result for 
access to recreation centres. Firms traditionally owned the assets used to 
provide these benefits, but only well paid employees - presumably those 
working in well paid formerly state owned enterprises - continue to have 
access to recreation centres for adults and children, while in low paid 
firms, holiday homes and resort facilities may have been either closed 
or divested2'*. In contrast, access to health care seems to have remai- *
2!Mikhalev [32] reports that in some cases, access to recreation centres is now 




























































































ned universal. The pressure on firms to cut labour costs and to divest 
themselves of social assets has apparently affected medical facilities less 
severely, which could indicate stronger preferences among employers for 
the retention of medical facilities at the work place.
The impact of the dummy for wage arrears differs significantly ac­
cording to the type of benefits and is consistent with two opposite ex­
pected effects. On the one hand, wage arrears reduce the probability of 
access to recreation centres (-3%), medical services (-3.5%). cheap meals. 
(-6 %), and other welfare transfers in-kind (-9%). presumably as a result 
of the negative profitability effect included when reporting delays and 
non-payment of wages. On the other hand, wage arrears were not signi­
ficant in explaining access to subsidised goods, for which the negative 
profitability effect may well be offset by the incentive to substitute cash 
payments into consumption goods. These estimates suggest that those 
benefits for which the negative profitability effect dominates over the 
substitution effect could be rapidly withdrawn if the financial situation 
of the firms that provide them does not improve. Alternatively, and as 
observed in the World Bank enterprise survey cited earlier, firms may 
well have strong incentives to provide various goods when these are close 
substituts for cash wages.
6.1.3 Effects o f  jo b  occupation
The impact of occupation on access to enterprise welfare is evaluated 
relative to skilled and unskilled workers, as no significant differences were 
found between the two categories. Controlling for other factors, being 
a top or middle manager increases significantly the probability of access 
to housing by 2%, access to recreation centres by 8%., and surprisingly, 
access to other welfare transfers in-kind by 10%. Professionals with a 
non technical profile also benefit by an estimated 2% increase in the 
probability of access to housing, while there are no significant differences 
among the other occupational categories. The positive returns observed 
mainly for managers tends to verify the presumption that managers have 
profited personally from the economic independence granted by the new 
status of their enterprises, whether state owned or privatised24. However,
24The problem about transparency in criteria for allocating social benefits is not 
new: two surveys in the Altai district in 19S2 and 1985 showed that only 7.7% of 
the members of the nomenklatura had housing problems in contrast with 40%: of 




























































































variation in access to enterprise benefits among workers with respect to 
position in the firm's structure of power is not observed for social support 
like medical facilities, cheap meals, and subsidised goods.
6.1.4 Im pact o f  jo b  characteristics
Sectoral effects are evaluated relative to the sector of industry, trans­
port. and construction. The results indicate first that industrial workers 
are not better provided with work-related benefits. Further, it is inte­
resting to note that only 3 years after the beginning of transition, the 
provision of enterprise benefits reflect very imperfectly the disparities 
between industries prevailing in the pre-reform period, in which workers 
in high priority sectors were better provided. For instance, access to 
housing is reduced by only 1 % in health/education. while it is increa­
sed by o% in agriculture, presumably because rural families may still be 
housed by the collective farms. Second, it is worth noting that access 
to several benefits is markedly higher in the banking/insurance sector - 
a new and rapidly expanding area in the transition period. There, the 
probability of access to medical services is increased by 7%. cheap meals, 
by 12%, and training-education schemes, by 6 %. The finding highlights 
both the positive impact on enterprise welfare of working in a profitable 
sector, and the fact that health' care is provided even outside the old 
industries. However, in new sectors like banking and insurance, medi­
cal services received by the employees may take the form of contractual 
insurance contributions, purchased outside the firm as is the case in We­
stern establishments, in contrast to old sectors, where firms may often 
own the hospital or polyclinic. Third, being employed in agriculture and 
trade/services/food distribution possesses statistically significant effects 
on access to subsidised goods and food. Relative to industry, the re­
turns are nearly 15% to being employed in agriculture and 6 % in the 
trade/services/food industries. This strengthens the presumption that 
firms may use their own production as a form of wage when it is pos­
sible and advantageous for them. Consequently, even with harder bud­
get constraints, those firms will have no apparent reason to interrupt 
the provision of such benefits. Fourth, firm-investments in human ca­
pital in the form of traiuing/education programs were relatively higher 
among employees in services (+1% ), education/health (+7%>), and ban­
king/insurance (+6.5%).




























































































found to positively affect the access to recreation centres, medical faci­
lities. and subsidised goods. Compared with small firms (less than 20 
employees), employees in large firms (>500 employees) are more likely 
to gain access to recreation centres, health care, and subsidised goods 
by the same identical mark-up (4%). These results are as expected, 
since both recreation centres and medical facilities have generally re­
quired large fixed social expenditures that are better absorbed in large 
companies. Furthermore, the higher probability of access to subsidised 
goods in large establishments could reflect the greater ability of large 
enterprises to negotiate and obtain discount prices for many goods. The 
paradoxical finding is that the size effect was not significant for housing, 
but this could be explained by the fact that most large companies have 
already transferred their housing stock to municipalities.
Controlling for other factors, the governance structure does also 
affect differentially the access to various benefits. Compared to Rus­
sian employees in new private firms, workers in state lease and state 
joint stock companies are more likely to gain access to recreation centres 
(+9%), medical facilities (+ 6%), cheap meals (+5% ), and subsidised 
goods (+ 8%). Workers in non-state joint stock enterprises are better 
provided with health care (+9%) and other welfare transfers in-kinds 
(+ 8%), while employees in firms sold to workers receive relatively more 
cheap meals (+ 8 %). The findings for employees in state enterprises may 
partly be explained by an easy access to state subsidises. In addition, 
compared with new private firms, both state or privatised firms already 
possess the social infrastructures for providing social services. Hence the 
current private/state and quasi-state differential in social benefits may 
be an important source of increased inequality in access to social bene­
fits at the work-place as the private sector grows during the transition. 
However, it is important to notice, first, that employees in new private 
firms seem to be compensated with higher cash wages2’ , second, that 
evidence suggests that fringe benefits are not exclusively observed in old 
sectors. A curious result is that no significant differences were found 
between new private companies and pure state owned enterprises. A 
possible explanation could be that the worst-off state firms, in which to­
tal labour compensation is lower than elsewhere are less likely to have 
been transformed in joint stock structure or even leased to external ma­
nagers. Finally, another interesting finding is the insignificant coefficients 2
2SThe mean sample wage is 350,000 roubles in the new private sector and 195,000 




























































































on the dummy representing working in a firm where the effective control 
belongs to the collective of workers. This is possibly because employee 
bargaining power has in practice little impact on the distribution of so­
cial reward when objective factors such as profitability make the supply 
of fringe benefits impossible. It could also mean that the collective of 
workers would prefer to push up cash-wages, than non-wage benefits.
It is also worth noticing that while employees in state lease and 
state joint stock companies are more likely to have access to recreation 
centres, medical services, cheap meals, and subsidised goods, the mark­
up disappears in privatised firms, except for health care and cheap meals. 
Although it is difficult to reach any strong conclusions with cross-section 
data, this result may indicate that the privatisation of the firm could 
have had a different impact according to the type of benefits. The fact 
that medical facilities, contrary to other benefits, are still more likely to 
be received by employees in privatised firms is not trivial and may again 
reflect stronger preferences of both employees and employers for retaining 
these benefits at the work place.
6.1.5 Geographical disparities
Residing in a rural or urban area is measured relative to living in Moscow 
or St-Petersburg. The coefficient on the urban dummy is positive and 
significant for access to recreation centres, with a mark-up near 4%. In 
addition, and as expected, living in a rural area, where the extent of the 
barter economy is larger, increases the probability of having access to 
subsidised goods by more than 89c.
Regional effects were also found to be significant in all equations 
except for medical services and training/education. but there do not sug­
gest dramatic regional variation in the distribution of enterprise benefits. 
The lowest coverage in terms of benefits is found in Siberia and Fare- 
ast. though the largest differential, observed for income support, does 
not exceed 59f. However, given the rapid process of decentralisation in 
progress, and the increasing potential gap in local authorities’ financial 
capacity to take over the social role of firms during the transition, sharp 





























































































Table 9: Results of the logit regressions oil fringe benefits
V a r i a b l e s H o u s in g R e c r e a t i o n
c e n t r e s
M e d ic a l
f a c i l i t i e s
C h e a p
m e a ls
S u  b s id is e d  
g o o d s
T r a i n in g
&
e d  u c a t io n
W e l f a r e
t r a n s fe r s
I n c o m e
v a r i a b le s :
M o n t h l y  w a g e 0 . 4 4 2 0 . 4 2 4 0 . 5 5 4 0 . 1 4 5 0 . 3 6 5
( i n  hun - ( 3 . 3 ) ( 3 . 5 ) ( 3 . 5 ) ( 3 . 2 ) ( 2 . 7  )
d r e d  t h o u s a n d
r o u b l e s )
W a g e  s q u a r e — 2 . 3 0 . 1 0 - 2 — 2 . 0 6 . 1 0 ” 2 — 4 . 1 1 . 1 0  “  2 - 3 . 0 9 . 1 0 "  2
( 2 . 1 ) ( 2 . 3 ) ( 2 . 5 ) ( 2 . 2 )
O t h e r  i n c o m e 6 . 8 . 1 0 ”  2
( 2 .2 )
W a g e  arr ea r s - 0 . 6 4 5 - 0 . 5 7 4 - 0 . 8 5 8 - 0 . 7 0 9
( 2 . 5 ) ( 2 . 7 ) ( 3 . 3 ) ( 3 . 0 ,
P e r s o n a l
c h a r a c t e r is t i c s :
- 0 . 0 5 7 - 0 . 0 2 3 - 0 . 0 2 6
( 2 . 8 ) ( 2 . 2 ) ( 2 )
N u m b e r  o f - 0 . 6 3 6 0 . 3 1 0
a d u l t s
( 2 . 6 ) ( 2 . 7 )
N u m b e r  o f 0 . 5 4 0 .21
c hi ld  ren
( 2 . 3 ) ( 1 . 7 )
P r i m a r y 0 . 3 2 9
e d u c a t i o n
( 0 . 4 )
T e c h n i c a l - 0 . 0 5 6
e d  u c a t i o n ( 0 . 2 )
H i g h  t e c h n i c a l - 0 . 2 3 2
e d u c a t i o n ( 0 . 8 )
G r a d u a t e - 0 . 7 8 7
( 2 . 3 )
O c c u p a t i o n :
M a n a g e r s 0 . 9 3 9 0 . 73 4 0 . 9 4 2
( 1 . 8 ) ( 2 . 1 ) ( 2 . 7 )
T e c h n i c a l - 0 . 5 4 8 - 0 . 0 5 0 0 . 3 0 8
p r o f e s s i o n a l s ( 0 . 7 ) ( 0 . 1 ) ( 0 . 8 )
N o n - t e c h  n ical 1 . 23 0 . 6 8 3
p r o f e s s i o n a l s ( 1 . 9 ) ( 1 . 5 ) ( 1 .5 )
T e c h n i c a l - 0 . 1 1 6 G.303 0 . 5 2 5
o f f i c e - w o r k e r s ( 0 . 2 ) ( 0 . 7 ) ( 1 . 5 )
N o n - t e c h n i c a l - 0 . 4 0 9 - 0 .2 6 4 0 . 5 1 4
o f f i c e - w o r k e r s ( 0 . 5 ) ( 0 . 5 ) ( 1 . 5 )
I n d u s t r i e s :
A g r i c u l t u r e 1 . 3 7 - 0 . 4 7 8 0 . 2  4 7 1 . 18 - 0 . 9 2 3 - 0 . 1 1 6
( 2 . 6 ) ( 1 . 1 ) ( 0 . 5 ) ( 3 . 4 ) ( 0 . 9 ) ( 0 . 3 )
T r a d e / S e r v i c e s - 0 . 6 0 6 0 . 0 3 2 - 0 . 0 4 4 3 1 .28 1 .06 - 0 . 3 8 4
( 0 . 8 ) ( 0 . 0 8 ) ( 1 ) ( 3 . 8 ) ( 2 .2 ) ( 1 .2 )
H e a l t h / E d  u c a t i o i - 1 . 1 5 0 . 1 8 8 0 . 6 8 4 - 0 .4 0 4 1 .86 - 0 . 1 3 4
( 1 . 7 ) ( 0 .6 ) ( 1 . 8 ) ( 0 . 9 ) ( 4 . 8 ) ( 0 . 4 )
B a n k i n g / i n s u r a n •e0 .773 0 . 8 7 2 1 . 33 - 0 .1 2 1 1 . 85 0 . 7 1 9




























































































T ab le  9: Continued
V a r i a b l e s H o u s in g R e c r e a t i o n
c e n t r e s
M e d ic a l
f a c i l i t ie s
C h e a p
m e a ls
S u b s i d i s e d
g o o d s
T r a i n in g
Ic
e d u c a t io n
W e l f a r e
t r a n s fe r s
E n t e r p r is e
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :
M e d i u m  f i rm 0 . 3 9 2 0 . 4 7 3 0 . 6 8 3 0 . 4 1 4 - 0 .2 4 6
( 0 . 9 ) ( 1 . 4 ) ( 2 ) ( 1.11 (1 )
L a r g e  f i rm 0 . 9 1 2 0 . 6 8 0 1 .24 0 . 8 9 8 - 1 .0 2
( 2 ) ( 1 . 7 ) ( 3 . 2 ) ( 1 . 9 ) ( 3 .1  )
S t a t e - 0 . 6 9 0 . 0 1 7 - 0 .2 4 9 - 0 . 2 0 8 0 . 0 2 6
e n t e r p r i s e
( 1 .6 ) ( 0 . 0 1 ) ( 0 . 5 ) ( 0 . 5 ) ( 0 . 0 7 )
L e a s e / J o i n t  s t o c 0 . 7 8 0 0 . 8 3 0 0 . 9 4 0 0 . 85 1 0 . 3 8 2
s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e ( 1 .8 ) ( 1 . 8 ) ( 2 .1  ) ( 2 .1  ) ( 1 )
C o l l e c t i v e  fa rm 0 . 2 2 9 - 0 .4 9 1 0 . 1 0 9 - 0 .0 6
( 0 . 2 ) ( 0 . 4 ) 10 .2 ) ( 0.1 )
W o r k e r 0 . 0 8 8 - 0 .5 7 1 1 . 16 0 . 20 1 0 . 4 6 2
c o n t r o l l e d
f i rm ( 0 . 1 ) ( 0 . 5 ) ( 1 . 7 ) ( 0 . 3 ) ( 0 . 8 )
N o n - s t a t e 0 . 0 2 8 1.11 0 . 1 3 0 . 4 2 9 0 . 7 7 2
j o i n t  s t o c k  c o m p n y ( 0 . 0 5 ) ( 2 . 1 1 ) ( 0 . 2 0 ) ( 0 . 8 4 ) ( 1 . 7 )
G e o g r a p h ic a l
v a r ia b le s :
R u r a l  r es id e n t 0 . 5 4 9 1 . 12
( 0 . 9 ) ( 2 . 3 )
L’ r b a n  r es id en t 0 . 8 9 3 0 . 1 7 2
( 1 . 8 ) ( 0 . 4 )
S o u t h - 1 . 2 2 0 . 1 4 9 - 0 . 4 4 9 0 . 2 3 4 0 . 2 1 0
( 2 ) ( 0 . 5 ) ( 1 . 4 ) ( 0 . 8 ) ( 0 . 9 )
U r a l / P r e - L : ral - 0 . 1 2 2 - 0 .3 9 1 - 0 . 3 9 4 - 0 . 3 4 9 0 . 2 0 4
( 0 . 3 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 . 1 ) (1 . 1  ) ( 0 . 8 )
S i b i r i a / F a r e a s t - 0 . 5 5 7 - 0 . 7 0 0 - 0 . 7 8 4 - 0 . 5 1 7 - 0 . 5 9 6
( 1 .1  ) ( 1 . 9 ) ( 2 . 3 ) ( 1 . 6 ) ( 2 . 2 )
P s e u d o 0 . 1 6 2 7 0 . 1 3 4 6 0 . 0 4 8 4 0 . 1 3 2 3 0 . 1 4 6 8 0 . 0 9 6 0 . 0 9 2
R - s q u a r e
%  o f  c o r r e c t l v
p o s i t i v e 100 100 0 40 75 0 50
p r e d i c t e d  v a l u es
%  o f  c o r r e c t l y
n e g a t i v e 97 93 91 9 3 91 95 88
p r e d i c t e d  v a l u e s
N u m b e r  o f
o b s e r v a t i o n s 1 2 4 6 1 2 46 12 46 1 2 4 6 1 2 46 1 2 46 1 2 46
N ote: The dum m y f o r  C ollective  fa rm  was om itted  in the recreation  cen tres equation because it con ta in s no  
observation . The re jection  o f  the o th er  variables was jo in tly  tested  at the 5%  level. The absolute values 








































































































(if =  206)
0.66 0.72 0.73 0.42 0.2S
First quartile 
(«• =  62)
0.24 0.25 0.29 0.1S o.os
Third quartile 
( i f  =  436)
0.91 1.11 0.79 0.34 0.59
Note: The mean wages for the whole sample and in the first and third quartile 
are in thousands of roubles.











Pu= 90 0.0492 0.050 0.0684 0.1073 0.0436
P u '= 2 50 0.0805 0.0852 0.1138 0.1499 0.0539
A  P 0.0312 0.0352 0.0495 0.0420 0.010
Note: Wages are in thousands of roubles and correspond respectively 
to the value of the first and the third quartile.
6 .2  Towards an explanation of job satisfaction
The second task of this paper was to explore the extent to which enter­
prise social services were important determinants of workers' well-being. 
Ordered logit estimates of the effect of pecuniary and uoiipecuniary be­
nefits on the reported level of job satisfaction are shown in Table 12 and 
shed some light on this issue. Almost all the variables entered in the 
equation are binary variables, except for wage. age. and the number of 
children and adults in the household. The change in the predicted pro­
babilities of reporting a high or fairly high level of job satisfaction for the 
dummies was computed at the mean values of all the variables.
Wage has the expected positive effect on job satisfaction and does 
not contradicts the standard assumption that a worker's well-being de­
pends on absolute income26 *. The sample wage elasticity computed from
26Relative earnings may become the main determinant of job satisfaction as soon
as the average wage is higher than that required to reach a certain standard of living, 
as in Western countries. This is not the case in Russia which explain the fact that 




























































































the model relates to the probability of reporting a high or fairly high 
level of job satisfaction2' and the estimate at the mean values of all the 
variables indicates that an increase of one point in wages yields to an 
increase of 0.41 point in the predicted probability.
Turning to the impact of fringe benefits, the coefficients are all 
highly significant exept for meals and have the expected signs. As repor­
ted in table 13. access to recreation centres raises the predicted probabi­
lity by 309?: other welfare transfers in-kind. 28%: subsidised goods. 22'/: 
training and education. 20%: medical facilities, 19%: and housing. 13%. 
Given the depressed level of household income in Russia, the stronger 
preferences among employees for recreation centres could be due to the 
fact that average workers and their families are unable to gain access to 
holiday homes other than those held by their enterprise. In turn, en­
terprise medical facilities and enterprise housing could be less valued by 
workers since, with their families, they can generally go to hospitals ran 
by the city health administration28 or receive housing from municipal 
authorities, thus being less dependent on these benefits.
In order to compare the contribution of cash with in-kind transfers 
in generating utility. I computed the predicted values of wage that would 
yield, holding other variables at their mean values, the same probability 
of reporting a high or fairly high level of job satisfaction generated by 
receiving the different sample enterprise benefits. The estimates are also 
presented in table 13 and indicate that the monetary transfers necessary 
to compensate for the provision of benefits, in terms of job satisfac­
tion. are very high. For instance, to keep the average worker's utility 
constant29, the average wage should be increased by 4.3 to compensate 
the access to medical facilities, and by 5.7 for holiday homes. These esti­
mates suggest that unless compensated by large increases in cash-wages, 
and if not just transferred to local authorities with a neutral impact on 
individuals, the interruption of social services from the enterprise could 
reduce significantly the standards of living for many workers.
Finally, there are a number of interesting correlations between job
2,Thc wage elasticity was computed as where P  =  1/(1 +  cbY.l — c^)).
However, this would not he the case in company towns.
29In the sense of having the same predicted probability of reporting a fairly or very 




























































































satisfaction and individual and job controls that I briefly summarize here. 
Less educated workers, with possibly less aspirations, were more satisfied, 
and so were the individuals with a vocational diploma. Compared with 
unskilled workers, occupational dummies other than non-teclmical office 
workers do also affect positively utility from work, possibly because more 
skilled workers also face more job opportunities. The estimates from the 
variables controlling for job attributes are more impressive. Job satisfac­
tion is negatively correlated with the presence of frequent conflicts among 
the collective of workers, and also with wage arrears. Individuals working 
in small establishments are more satisfied than those in medium or large* 
firms. Interestingly, being employed in the new private sector and in a 
firm controlled by a collective of workers has a large and well-defined 
positive effect on job satisfaction. The inclusion of the occupational 
dummies drives labour hoarding to insignificance, presumably because 
unskilled and at the same time less satisfied workers are more likely to 
have been on unpaid leave. Lastly, the potential role of job security has 
the expected impact. The expectation of being laid off has a strong ne­
gative effect and the inclusion of this dummy variable decreases sharply 
the significance of the gender dummy, suggesting that the lower level of 
job satisfaction among women can partly be attributed to their higher 
expected probability of being laid off. But the data still give statistical 
credence to a small gender gap in the level of happiness at work, even 
when controlling for individual and job characteristics.,in
3UIn order to test the judiciousness of two separate specifications, one for men and 
one for women. I estimated a general model for the whole sample. Apart from the 
explanatory variables, this unrestricted model included a dummy for gender and all 
the interaction terms between these variables and the dummy for sex. A restricted 
model was then estimated, excluding all the terms that account for sex differentiation. 
A likelihood ratio test was then performed and the null hypothesis that all the coef­





























































































Table 12: Ordered logit estimates for job satisfaction
Variables Coefficients (.1) t-Statistics (f)
Labour compensation:
Wage (Hundred thousands roubles) 0.225 6.75
Fringe benefits:
Housing 1.37 3.9
Recreation centres 1.237 5.3
Medical facilities 0.601 2.9
Cheap meals 0.340 1.5
Subsidised goods 1.0C7 5.3
Training/Education 0.650 2.6
Other welfare transfers 1.551 8.7
Job controls:
Wage arrears -.381 3.0
Labour hoarding -0.395 1.4
Conflicts with employers -0.564 1.3
Conflicts among employees -0.827 2.3
Employee power 0.413 2.0
Ownership structure:
Privatised enterprise 0.109 0.5
Private enterprise 0.920 2.9
Size of establishment:
Medium firm -0.308 1.8
Large firm -0.378 1.8
Dummy industries:
Agriculture 0.244 1.0
Trade. Service 0.260 1.3
Health, Education -0.175 0.4
Banking, Insurance 0.11 0.3
Individual controls:




Primary education 1.493 2.8




Rural resident 0.218 0.9
Small city 0.539 2.5





























































































Variables Coefficients (9 ) t-Statistics (f)
Occupational dummies:
Managers 0.710 3.2
Technical professionals 0.474 2.0
Non-technical professionnals 0.4S7 1.9
Technical office-workers 0.410 1.7
Non-technical office-workers 0.23G 1.1
Skilled-workers 1.04 2.4
Household structure:
Number of children 0.04S 0.7
Number of adults 0.097 1.6
Other income (hundred thousands roubles) 0.007 0.4
Married -0.23S 0.9
Local labour market condition:
Job opportunity 0.202 1.6
Unemployment expectation -0.705 5.2
Pseudo R-square 0.19S2
Number of observation 1256
T a b le  13: Im p a ct  o f  fr in g e  b en efits  and  equ iva len t tra n sfer in  cash
H ou sin g R e cre a tio n
cen tres
M ed ica l
facilit ies
S u bsid ised
good s
T ra in in g  & 
e d u ca t io n
W elfa re
transfers
'Po 0.116 0.099 0.102 0.090 0.109 0.084
7 Pi 0.242 0.404 0.288 0.323 0.31.3 0.364
3A P 0.125 0.304 0.185 0.224 0.204 0.279
*w 750 1180 880 980 950 1085
5w/w 3.6 5.7 4.3 4.7 4.6 5.3
1 Predicted probabilities when the benefit is not received. ~ Predicted probabilities when 
the benefit is received. 3 Change in predicted probabilities.
4 Estimated wages that provide the same P\. 5 Estimated wage on average wage.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I dealt with the distribution of enterprise benefits among 
the working population in Russia and on their impact on individual's 
well being, as expressed in self-reported levels of job satisfaction. I used 
a representative sample of the population carried out in September 1994, 
three years after price liberalisation, and while the process of privatisa­
tion and divestiture of enterprise social assets was already taking place. 
To my knowledge, these issues have been barely investigated up to now, 




























































































sharp inflation, remain at the time of the sample an important compo­
nent of the working population's living standards. However, it is not 
difficult to point out a number of limitations of this empirical analysis. 
Our measures of social transfers from the enterprise are rather limited 
and suffer from a small sample size. Also, the information at the indi­
vidual level remains weak: seniority and human capital differences have 
been approximated by quite crude proxies. Finally, the self-reported level 
of job satisfaction was measured on an ordinal scale, and may be subject 
to large measurement error.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the data presents some intere­
sting insights into the access to enterprise welfare at the end of 1994. 
First, the magnitude of fringe benefits can be partly attributed to a form 
of Soviet legacy, reflected in the positive impact of working in large for­
merly state-owned firms. Second, the ability of retaining access to these 
benefits at the work place seems to depend significantly on the financial 
position of the firm the employees were working for. Third. Soviet legacy 
is only part of the story, and the observed distribution of enterprise be­
nefits may reflect to some degree the structure of employee or employer 
preferences for various benefits. This could explain, for instance, why 
medical facilities and cheap meals were also provided in new private sec­
tors such as banking and insurance, or why fringe benefits in the form of 
consumption goods were more concentrated in sectors where cash-wages 
can easily be substituted by the firm's production.
In terms of equity, the findings demonstrate the presence of great 
disparities among the type of benefits provided by firms and tend to 
highlight two pressing inequalities. First, the compensation hypothesis, 
according to which individuals accept less desirable working conditions 
in return for higher cash wages, seemed to hold only in the very top 
wage distribution, while low paid workers were in general also less well 
provided with fringe benefits. Thus, social transfers from firms seem 
to increase income inequalities rather than decreasing them. Second, 
access to several benefits was strongly related to the position of an indi­
vidual in the firm s power structure, which raises the inherent problem of 
transparency in the allocation of enterprise support. However, inequali­
ties in 11011-wage benefits were mainly attached to job characteristics and 
appeared to result much more from a form of economic segmentation 
between and within firms, due presumably to such factor as profitabi­




























































































grounds of personal characteristics. On the other hand, access to hash- 
social services at the work-place, such as medical care, was found to have 
remained fairly well equally distributed among the working population. 
At the same time, provision of enterprise housing and cheap meals was 
positively related with specific needs, such as the number of dependents.
In terms of individual’s well being, the data provide evidence that 
the social services provided by firms, along with cash-wages, raise job 
satisfaction significantly. Also, the estimated raise in cash wages neces­
sary to compensate, in terms of job satisfaction, for the absence of fringe 
benefits, are found to be considerable. Therefore, the low level of job 
satisfaction reported in the data may well be understood in tin1 light of 
the sharp decline in both real wages and fringe benefits that occured in 
the last few years, while reflecting the difficulty of finding another job 
in the transition period that better fits individuals‘s preferences. Mo­
reover. since large compensating wage increases are unlikely to occur in 
the current context, and while local authorities are not always willing to 
take over the social infrastructures held by firms, the cessation of social 
benefits from enterprises could alter considerably the living standards of 
the working population. Specifically, this raises the important question 
about the evolution of enterprise social coverage during the transition. 
This could be addressed in further research if access to similar data from 
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